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JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: BULWARK OF FREEDOM OR 
PRECARIOUS SECURITY? By Christopher Wolfe.1 Pa-
cific Grove, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company. 
1991. Pp. ix, 166. Paper, $12.25. 
Thomas Morawetz2 
Academic discussion of judicial decision-making, and particu-
larly of textual interpretation, has undergone an unprecedented 
revolution in the last two decades. Twenty years ago politics 
framed the debate. In the backwash of the Warren Court, judicial 
activism was understood as a symptom and tool of liberalism and 
left-wing political belief, judicial restraint a manifestation of conser-
vatism and the right. Now the debate is framed by philosophy of 
language and epistemology. Theorists worry about whether the 
speaker or the hearer controls meaning, whether assumptions about 
shared values and shared knowledge must be deconstructed into 
disparate voices and agendas. How does the contrast between activ-
ism and restraint survive in this brave new world? 
Popular discussion about judges has been colored little, if at 
all, by the academic revolution. The media and the political parties 
persist in seeing a political continuum (from left to right) as mirror-
ing the distinction between activism and restraint. The Bork con-
troversy reinforced the prevailing stereotypes.3 Ex cathedra 
reflections by judges themselves often echo the stereotypes as well. 
Whatever ultimate merit and resilience the new philosophical 
and linguistic approach may prove to have, at least it affords a per-
spective for criticism. It teaches a catechism of questions and dis-
tinctions that, as used by contemporary writers, are tools of 
intellectual clarification. From this perspective, the older political 
mode of analysis can be faulted as naive on two grounds. It takes 
the attitudes and positions that happened to crystallize between 
1954 and 1970 as definitive of alternative styles of judging and alter-
native judicial philosophies. That is, it takes a shallow and transi-
tory distinction as deep. More important, it relies on untenable 
assumptions about meaning, interpretation, and value. 
Christopher Wolfe's new and awkwardly titled essay, Judicial 
1. Associate Professor of Political Science, Marquette University. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. I wish to thank my 
research assistant, Melinda Westbrook, for editorial help. 
3. Judge Bork himself has been one of the leading promulgators of the distinction and 
one of the leading critics of judicial activism. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: 
The Political Seduction of the Law (Free Press, 1990). 
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Activism: Bulwark of Freedom or Precarious Security?, is an exercise 
in the old style of analysis. The academic revolution is barely men-
tioned and has had no impact. Professor Wolfe sets himself two 
goals. The first is to offer a primer of the arguments on each side of 
the activism debate and to be as even-handed as possible in point, 
counterpoint. The second goal is to show that the activists lose the 
debate, "that judicial activism is an unfortunate phenomenon and 
that the United States would be better off without it." The risk of 
schizophrenia in serving both goals is extreme. Primer or polemic? 
Professor Wolfe chooses not to choose. 
One danger in being fair and hostile at the same time is, of 
course, that fairness (or hostility) will be compromised. Another is 
that the fair and hostile parts of the analysis will be out of sync. 
Professor Wolfe tries mightily to circumvent these dangers, even to 
the extent of awarding some rounds to the activists. He concedes at 
one point that "judicial activism has more often been a stimulus to 
political activity than an obstacle." At another, he admits that the 
threat of judicial tyranny is not serious and has been exaggerated by 
his confederates. At other points, however, Wolfe assumes a com-
munitarian stance and suggests that matters usurped by the Court 
should indeed be left to legislative processes on the state or even the 
community level in the interest of stimulating political activity. 
And he plays the judicial tyranny card aggressively when he de-
scribes how judicial activism affects the balance of good and bad. 
Consistency is not his strong suit. 
Three aspects of Professor Wolfe's essay deserve special con-
sideration: his account of activism, his method of evaluating activ-
ism, and his disregard of the revolution in judicial scholarship. 
Curiously but imaginatively, Professor Wolfe begins with two 
alternative definitions of judicial activism, one relativistic, the other 
absolutist. According to the first and more familiar definition, 
drawn from legal realist assumptions, all judges "make" law to 
some extent, but activist judges make law less inhibitedly and more 
ambitiously. According to the second definition, which Wolfe de-
fends as preferable, legal realism is wrong and judges may perfectly 
well (and should) adhere to a "traditional" mode of interpretation 
in which they are not making law at all, not balancing interests and 
not establishing rules in a quasi-legislative way. Wolfe claims, 
moreover, that the traditional mode was generally understood, 
practiced, and seen as relatively unproblematic until the twentieth 
century. 
The tantalizing promissory notes in this overture are not re-
deemed in the rest of the book. Although Wolfe seems committed 
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to rejecting the new scholarly attitudes and agenda of questions, he 
does not give us his grounds or justify his preferences. This sparks 
questions. Did nineteenth-century judges see themselves as Wolfe 
claims?4 If so, does the hypothesis that they saw the traditional 
mode as unproblematic give us any reason to see it as 
unproblematic? 
Professor Wolfe initially associates six features with judicial ac-
tivism and adheres to that characterization throughout the book.s 
He offers these features as corollaries of the claim that "activist 
judges are committed to provide judicial remedies for a wide range 
of social wrongs and to use their power ... to do so." From this it 
follows, according to Wolfe, (1) that judges need not adhere to the 
intentions of the framers or to the determinate meaning of the con-
stitutional text, (2) that judges are not bound inviolably by prece-
dent, (3) that judges may minimize procedural constraints on 
arriving at "important" judicial decisions, (4) that judges need not 
defer systematically to more democratic branches of government, 
(5) that judges may deliver broad, quasi-legislative opinions, and 
(6) that judges' remedial powers have broad scope. 
Wolfe assumes that these features coalesce into a coherent 
stance toward judicial interpretation. Whether they do or not, how-
ever, is a matter of historical accident. Some of the Warren Court's 
more noteworthy decisions seemed to many observers to illustrate 
this conception of activism.6 Under other historical circumstances, 
however, the norms of adherence to precedent and deference to the 
legislature may be diametrically opposed. Moreover, when a court 
is convinced that either the legislature or past courts have betrayed 
the framers or the constitutional text, it may have to choose be-
tween deference to legislators and precedent, on one hand, and 
faithful adherence to constitutional resources on the other. Thus, 
some of the features Wolfe finds to be characteristic of activism are 
as likely as not to be incompatible. 
A second problem with this multi-part account is that its terms 
are vague and hyperbolic. Has any judge ever thought herself "invi-
olably" bound by precedent, thought that no precedent, even ones 
4. Many contemporary scholars challenge the suggestion that the modem conception 
of adherence to original intent was accepted uncontroversially by the founders and by jurists 
in the nineteenth century. H. Jefferson Powell argues, for example, that the claim that "mod-
em intentionalism was the original presupposition of American constitutionalism" is "histori-
cally mistaken." H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Meaning of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. 
Rev. 885, 948 (1985). 
5. This characterization seems to be the core of his argument whether one adopts a 
relativistic or an absolutist definition of activism. 
6. Nonetheless, aspects of Wolfe's characterization are inherently invidious and fit 
neither the Warren Court nor any other. See my argument in text below. 
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inconsistent with each other, could be overturned? Has any judge 
so rigidly adhered to "procedural constraints" that she has not felt 
compelled to consider the substantive importance of each particular 
case and context? Does any judge defer "systematically" (whatever 
that means) to "more democratic" branches of government? Does 
systematic deference require a commitment to never finding legisla-
tion unconstitutional? If not, what does it entail? In much of his 
characterization of activism, Professor Wolfe seems to follow a hid-
den agenda. If all judges overrule precedent at times, then activists 
must be those who do so wrongly. If all judges sometimes overturn 
legislative acts, then activists must be those who do so by the wrong 
criteria. Thus, his characterization of activism is invidious ab initio. 
Scholars use various methods to evaluate theories of judicial 
decisionmaking. As academic discussion has moved from political 
to philosophical underpinnings, the prevailing method of evaluation 
has shifted from attention to the political and social effects of vari-
ous judicial practices to the coherence and consistency of such 
practices. 1 
Current attention focuses, in other words, on such questions as 
these: Do activism and restraint really characterize coherent and 
generalizable judicial strategies? Are they based on defensible theo-
ries of meaning and value? Do these terms define the main alterna-
tive ways of proceeding? 
I have already questioned Professor Wolfe's assumptions that 
his version of activism is coherent and generalizable and that it rep-
resents an objective and not invidious description. On the basis of 
these assumptions, he evaluates the (allegedly) competing ap-
proaches on the basis of their putative political and social effects. 
He asks which method produces better results. 
This question is itself fraught with risk of abuse and ambiguity. 
How does one limit and identify the relevant evidence? One may 
examine, as Wolfe does, a circumscribed slice of history-the per-
formance of the Warren Court, with cursory asides to the periods of 
economic laissez faire and the New Deal-and assess these results. 
Or one can look at the entire course of our constitutional experience 
and ask whether we were better off with activist or restrained 
courts. Or one can look at the effects sub specie aeternitatis and ask 
whether we are generally better off with activist courts, because of 
7. As a result, problems of interpretation (or hermeneutics) have been the subject of 
many recent symposia. Among the most important have been those at II Cardozo L. Rev. 
921 (1990), and 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. I (1985). Almost all writers in the domains of feminist 
theory, critical legal studies, and law and literature concern themselves with hermeneutic 
issues. 
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anticipated effects on morale, participation, and citizen interest. Or, 
finally, one can question whether we are ever wise enough to answer 
any of these questions. 
The game is one at which the ancient Sophists would have 
done themselves proud. At any point of the game, causal links may 
be questioned, value judgments may be proclaimed, and-in the al-
ternative-the very possibility of finding links or making any value 
judgments at all may be raised as a trump. Answering any of the 
questions with finality, or even plausibility, requires more expertise 
in social psychology and in political analysis than even the most 
arrogant practitioners of these fields should claim to have. Con-
sider, for example, the following dilemmas. Have Miranda and its 
progeny benefited society by insuring respect and protection for 
criminal defendants or have they damaged society by crippling 
crime control? Has Roe v. Wade been good or bad for American 
society? What about Brown? 
Volumes could and have been written about subtopics of each 
question. The questions themselves are fatally unfocussed. A critic 
of Roe may oppose abortion tout court, or she may feel that the 
Court did not go far enough and thus sowed confusion and dissent, 
or she may think that such matters are best left to legislatures, 
which can marshal public opinion and ameliorate controversy. In 
the latter case, she may feel that controversies are generally better 
handled by legislators, or she may feel that this is so only for spe-
cially intractable issues. All of these positions are defensible-and 
so are the diametrically opposite positions. Any attempt, however, 
to say simply that Roe (or Miranda, or Brown) was good or bad, 
sound or unsound, and to generalize from that observation to an 
attitude toward judicial activism is to display disconcerting naivete. 
Major parts of Professor Wolfe's argument are precisely of this 
shape. He chooses the best known and most dramatic "activist" 
opinions and asks whether they were good or bad for American 
society. He corrals the putatively "liberal" arguments for a pre-
sumptive case that they were good, and concludes provisionally that 
activism is good. Then he steps back and lists some counterargu-
ments against the same cluster of opinions. Finally, he questions 
whether anyone can see far enough into the future or take an 
atemporal viewpoint to address goodness or badness with confi-
dence. None of this works, because it is arbitrary; countermoves, 
counterinferences, and counter-conclusions are always fully imagi-
nable and available. 
What Professor Wolfe's consideration of activism leaves out is 
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formidable. The yield of the last two decades of constitutional the-
ory has at least three elements that are relevant to his aims. 
Thomas Greys and Richard Kay9 are among the many theo-
rists who recognize that the choice between adherence to original 
intent and so-called activism may at most be an academic exercise. 
Both point out the scope and importance of established constitu-
tional doctrines that are in no way traceable to the intentions of the 
founders. These constitutional inventions involve federalism, incor-
poration, virtually all elements of the Bill of Rights, and so on. 
Thus, even if activism is largely a twentieth-century strategy of deci-
sionmaking, what would it take to reverse the effects of that strat-
egy? Note how many of the products of activism are now at the 
established center of constitutional doctrine and no longer 
controversial. 
Second, our Constitution is, by any reckoning, an old constitu-
tion. This implies not only that it is virtually inconceivable to undo 
two hundred years of constitutional evolution, much of it fueled by 
putatively activist attitudes, but also that the founders' ideas and 
principles will generally be made relevant to our world at a high 
level of abstractness. Adherence to what the founders meant by 
"due process," "equal protection," "unreasonable searches and 
seizures," and the "free exercise" of religion is possible only with 
regard to ways in which their world is congruent with our own. 
Congruence, in tum, is most likely to be found in general and ab-
stract ways. Moreover, claims of congruence are likely to be highly 
controversial; controversy will characterize both claims that an as-
pect of the founders' world corresponds to an aspect of our own and 
claims that the founders had a particular level of generality in mind. 
Our ability to distinguish activism from restraint depends on how 
confidently we can resolve such controversies. 
Finally, contemporary theory is informed by the insights of 
hermeneutics, which questions the distinction between "under-
standing the text on its own terms and reading the interpreter's con-
cerns into it."10 Hermeneutic approaches to the process of 
retrieving meaning from texts stress that the imposition of the inter-
preter's interests is neither willful nor deliberate, but rather uncon-
scious and inevitable. This way of addressing interpretation has 
8. See, for example, Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? 27 
Stan. L. Rev. 703 (1975). 
9. See Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudi· 
cation: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. L. Rev. 226 (1988). 
10. David Couzens Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and Poststructurolist Per-
spectives, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 135, 137 ( 1985). 
486 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 8:480 
transformed legal theory, most notably as the understructure of 
critical studies, including critical feminism. 
Hermeneutic approaches undercut the distinction between ac-
tivism and restraint by implying that the idea of restraint as respect 
for the true meaning of a text is naive and that what the critic calls 
"activism" is the practicing judge's attempt at faithful understand-
ing. If it is possible to save the distinction from this widely accepted 
critique, Professor Wolfe gives no basis for such a salvage effort. 
Given the wide and growing gap between academic discourse about 
interpretation and the common rhetoric of restraint that gives "con-
servatives" their protective camouflage, it would be interesting to 
see a thorough and rigorous attempt to define and unseat judicial 
activism. Based as it is on naive methods and outdated assump-
tions, this book is not that book. 
WHOM DOES THE CONSTITUTION COMMAND? By 
Larry Alexandert and Paul Horton.2 Westport, Cf.: Green-
wood Press. 1988. Pp. xii, 169. $37.95. 
Thomas P. Lewis 3 
I 
This is a challenging, carefully written book, offered by its au-
thors as a guide to clear thinking about the nature of constitutional 
violations.4 The authors contend that a "root" question, posed in 
their title, is presented in almost any case in which doctrines such as 
state action or "under color of law" are in play, but that a compre-
hensible answer is almost never offered by the Supreme Court. 
They are emphatic about their purpose. It is "conceptual, analyti-
cal, and exegetical in character, not argumentative or normative." 
They have no intention to answer their titular question with respect 
to any constitutional provision, and they refuse to take issue with 
any particular case. Under attack is the "conceptual morass" cre-
ated by the Court's failure to focus explicitly on the question they 
pose. 
They are agreed on several abstract analytical points. Three 
I. Professor of Law, University of San Diego. 
2. Professor of Law, University of San Diego. 
3. William T. Lafferty Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. 
4. I have exercised great care to describe the authors' positions accurately. Because 
their book is an elaborate but tightly written effort to touch all the bases created by their 
analytic framework, the risk of some distortion in a summary may be unavoidable. 
